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A CIVIL LAW JURIST’S PERSPECTIVE ON
INTERMEDIARY RISK IN THE INDIRECT
HOLDING SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES
A COMMENT ON SCHWARCZ & BENJAMIN
KON SIK KIM*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Professors Schwarcz and Benjamin classify the situations in
which an intermediary holds securities for investors in their highly
stimulating article entitled Intermediary Risk in the Indirect Holding
System for Securities.  The authors identify two situations in which an
intermediary holds securities for investors: that in which the interme-
diary does, and does not, have beneficial rights.1  The authors seem-
ingly assume that intermediary risk does not arise where the interme-
diary has no beneficial rights.  This point is made explicitly in an
article published previously by Professor Schwarcz.2  In Intermediary
Risk in a Global Economy, Professor Schwarcz discusses two cases in
which the intermediary has no beneficial rights: namely, trust and
bail.  In civil law countries, however, there is yet another example: the
case of the so-called commission agent.  A commission agent is a
merchant who executes contracts for commission in its own name, on
behalf of the customer’s account.  Securities brokers are the most
common example.  Securities brokers normally hold securities for
their customers.  Yet whose claim will prevail if a broker goes bank-
rupt, the broker’s creditors or its customers?  In the absence of spe-
cial statutory provision, one cannot be sure that the latter has priority
over the former.3  Thus, in theory, substantial intermediary risk may
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3. The Korean Commercial Code specifically indicates that “goods or valuable instru-
ments which have been received by the commission agent from his principal, goods, valuable
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exist in a jurisdiction with no special provisions on this issue.
Schwarcz and Benjamin, however, focus on the situation in which an
intermediary transfers an undivided fractional interest in securities to
an investor.  They emphasize that in some civil law jurisdictions, the
investor may not necessarily prevail over the intermediary’s general
creditors.  Thus, the authors propose that such states enact into law a
rule clearly indicating that such a transfer constitutes a valid and en-
forceable transfer, and that the transferee may assert its rights only
against the intermediary in privity.  I do not object to, and even wel-
come, the authors’ proposal as a general proposition.  In the Korean
context, however, the authors’ proposal may not be relevant.
II.  THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM UNDER THE
SECURITIES TRANSACTION ACT
Korea, like other civil law countries such as Germany and Japan,
has special provisions on the indirect securities holding and book-
entry transfer system.  While Germany and Japan have enacted sepa-
rate acts for those provisions, Korea has incorporated them into the
Securities Transaction Act (STA), the primary legislation for regu-
lating securities markets.4  Under the STA’s indirect holding provi-
sions, the intermediary risk discussed by the authors is addressed
adequately.  Ultimate investors, rather than intervening intermediar-
ies, are regarded as holders of securities, as long as the books are kept
properly.  The provisions are applicable only to those securities de-
posited with the Korea Securities Depository (KSD), the only
authorized securities depository in Korea.  Thus, in theory, the provi-
sions are inapplicable to those securities not deposited with the KSD.
In practice, however, there is virtually no instance in which an inter-
mediary fails to deposit with the KSD.  Under the STA, brokers are
required to deposit investors’ securities with the KSD.5  Other finan-
cial firms including banks are under no such duty, but may choose to
use the KSD as sub-custodian, which they do consistently.  Indeed, fi-
nancial firms serving as custodians for foreign investors are required
instruments, or claims acquired through sales and purchases in the commission agency are re-
garded as the possession of or claims of the principal in the relations between the principal and
the commission agent or the latter’s creditor.”  SANGBOP [Commercial Code], Act No. 1000 of
1962, art. 103 (S. Korea).  The Japanese Commercial Code has no such provision.  SH H  (Jap.).
4. Chunggwon Koraebop [Securities Transaction Act], Act No. 2920 of 1976, arts. 173–
178, translated in 11 KOREAN LEGIS. RES. INST., STATUTES OF THE REP. OF KOREA 720 (1997).
5. Id. art. 44-4.
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to deposit them with the KSD.6  While institutional investors may de-
posit their assets directly with the KSD, individual investors must go
through their brokers.  Brokers must keep a book and list such infor-
mation as the names and holdings of investors.7  The KSD must keep
its own book for the holdings of depositing institutions and distin-
guish between their house and customer accounts.8  As a legal matter,
investors registered in the broker’s book are regarded as co-owners of
the securities.9  As a practical matter, however, they are treated as
owners of the securities equivalent to their co-ownership shares.  For
example, an investor registered as a beneficial shareholder in the
book of an intermediary may exercise most of his shareholder rights
directly, although he cannot request the delivery of his share of secu-
rities from the KSD.  The proposed rule thus will add virtually noth-
ing to the rule existent under the STA.  The proposed rule, however,
may be useful in countries that lack such provisions.
III.  THE SITUATION IN JURISDICTIONS THAT LACK
INDIRECT HOLDING PROVISIONS
As Schwarcz and Benjamin discuss, the situation with respect to
intermediary risk is unclear in jurisdictions that lack indirect holding
provisions.  In my opinion, in such jurisdictions, an investor who has
acquired from an intermediary an undivided fractional interest in se-
curities should have priority over the intermediary’s general creditors.
Such a result may frustrate the creditor’s expectations, especially if he
or she has been misled into thinking that the intermediary is the sole
owner of the securities it holds.  A creditor is not entitled, however, to
rely on the appearance of an intermediary holding securities.  Under
the Korean Civil Code, for example, transfer of ownership of a physi-
cal asset does not necessarily require an actual delivery of the asset in
question.  Transfer may be made by the transferor’s declaration to
serve as an immediate possessor of the asset for the transferee.10  If
transfer is completed by this method, those creditors extending credit
to the transferor without knowledge of this transfer may be disap-
pointed later.  But such a result may be unavoidable, as the parties
may achieve the same result by first having the transferor actually de-
6. Chunggwonup Kamdok Kyujong [Securities Business Supervision Regulation], art. 7-
15 (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
7. Chunggwon Koraebop, supra note 4, art. 174-2, § 1.
8. Id. art. 174, § 3.
9. Id. art. 174-4, § 1.
10. Id. art. 189 (concerning the recharacterization of possession).
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liver the asset to the transferee and then having the transferee deposit
it back to the transferor.  If transfer by the possession recharacteriza-
tion method can be made for all the assets of the intermediary, there
is no reason why it should not be allowed for a part of the assets.  So
even in a civil law country, transfer of an undivided fractional interest
in securities by the recharacterization possession method should be
allowed in the absence of special legislation.  In such a case, the trans-
feror and the transferee are deemed to co-own the assets.  The trans-
feree can make a claim to the transferor-custodian for delivery of his
share of securities.
Why, then, should one need the rule proposed by Schwarcz and
Benjamin?  When the intermediary directly holds the assets, such a
rule may not be necessary.11  But when the intermediary wishes to
transfer a fractional undivided interest in the securities held by a
higher-tier intermediary, it is not necessarily clear in civil law coun-
tries whether the transfer can be validly completed by the transferring
intermediary’s notice to the higher-tier holder.12  Under the conven-
tional view, a property interest may not be transferred without speci-
fying the subject of the interest.  The rule proposed by the authors
will clarify that transfer of such a fractional undivided interest may be
completed without going through the cumbersome process of specifi-
cation.
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CO-OWNERSHIP
APPROACH UNDER THE STA
As mentioned earlier, thanks to the indirect holding provisions in
the STA, intermediary risk does not matter for investors in Korean
securities.13  But it by no means follows that the co-ownership ap-
proach adopted by the STA creates no problems in other respects.
First, the co-ownership concept does not correspond well with so-
called dematerialized securities, as investors’ interest in such securi-
ties may not be regarded as ownership from the technical legal per-
spective.14  Second, the co-ownership approach generates substantial
11. Of course, it is good to eliminate any uncertainty surrounding this issue.
12. See, e.g., Kiny h  iinkai [Financial Law Board], Sh ken no furikae Kessai ni Kakaru
h sei ni Kansuru ch kan ronten seiri ni tsuite [Interim Note on Legal Rules Relating to Book-
Entry Securities Settlement], at 6 n.13 (Apr. 3, 2000), available at http://www.flb.jp/publication
06-j.PDF (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
13. On the other hand, it may matter for those Korean investors who invest in foreign se-
curities.
14. Chunggwon Koraebop, supra note 4, however, does not distinguish between certifi-
cated and certificateless securities.
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transaction costs in cross-border securities transactions, since it often
may be difficult for the parties to identify and comply with the gov-
erning laws applicable to the transaction in question.  Although uni-
fying conflict-of-laws rules may somewhat reduce the uncertainty in-
volved, unification has its own problems.15  In that respect, I join
many experts in thinking that the “security entitlement” concept
adopted in the U.C.C. Article 8 is preferable.
V.  CONCLUSION
The securities entitlement under the U.C.C. Article 8 is a mix-
ture of property and in personam rights.  It has a property right fea-
ture as its holder has priority over the intermediary’s general credi-
tors; at the same time, it has an in personam feature as its holder can
assert his or her right only against the intermediary with whom he or
she directly deals.  A holder of security entitlements may, however,
determine how the voting rights are exercised.  In effect, the rights of
entitlement holders are not significantly different from those of
shareholders under the STA.  They differ only at a conceptual level.
Importing a foreign concept like security entitlement is not easy, es-
pecially because it directly undermines the fundamental division be-
tween property and in personam rights in traditional civil law.  The
neat distinction between the two kinds of rights, however, has already
been subject to challenge.  Although the indirect securities holding
system in civil law countries such as Korea, Japan, and Germany has
been consistent with the co-ownership approach, the element of pos-
session in the co-ownership of securities is becoming increasingly ab-
stract and artificial.  And when we give up the notion of certificate,
which is not really essential in the book entry settlement system, we
will no longer be able to maintain the concept of ownership, and we
will be forced to devise a new concept to represent the interest of
lower-tier investors.
15. Schwarcz & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 329–30 & nn.66–71.
